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A B S T R A C T
Since the seminal ‘Little Albert’ study by Watson and Rayner (1920), fear conditioning has become one of the
most commonly used paradigms for studying the etiology of anxiety-related disorders. In a fear conditioning
procedure, a (neutral) conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), re-
sulting in fear-related conditioned responses (CRs) to the CS. Whereas fear conditioning research initially fo-
cused on observable elements in the environment (i.e., CSs, USs, and their contingency) and their effects (i.e.,
CRs), subsequent research indicated that attention should also be given to unobservable mental events (e.g.,
intrusive memories of aversive outcomes) to more fully account for the symptomatology of anxiety disorders. In
this paper, we review the research relating to four major research questions on the relationship between mental
imagery and fear conditioning: (1) Can mental imagery substitute for actual stimulus administration? (2) Can
mental imagery inflate CRs? (3) Can fear conditioning result in the installment of mental images as CRs (i.e.,
intrusions)? (4) Can mental imagery-based interventions reduce CRs? For all these research questions, tentative
confirmatory evidence has been found and these findings corroborate contemporary conditioning theories.
Nonetheless, we point to several open questions and methodological issues that require further research.
1. Introduction
Since the publication of Watson and Rayner's seminal ‘Little Albert’
study (Watson & Rayner, 1920), fear conditioning has become one of
the most widely used paradigms to study the acquisition, extinction,
and return of fear (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Vervliet, Craske, &
Hermans, 2013). The core procedural elements of the fear conditioning
paradigm are the pairing of an initially neutral stimulus, called the
conditioned stimulus (CS), with an aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US), resulting in the establishment of conditioned responses (CRs) to
the CS, even in absence of the US. Though certain aspects of Watson and
Rayner's original study were criticized (see Fridlund, Beck, Goldie, &
Irons, 2012; Hermans, Boddez, & Vervliet, 2019), many subsequent
studies have demonstrated that fear conditioning can install behavioral,
cognitive, and physiological responses related to fear. To date, fear
conditioning is one of the dominant paradigms for studying the etiology
of fear and anxiety-related disorders (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez,
Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).
The ‘Little Albert’ study also pioneered the new psychological ter-
ritory of behaviorism (Skinner, 1963; Watson, 1913). Behaviorism fo-
cuses on analyzing behavior in terms of observable environmental
elements (such as CSs and USs) and their effects (observable CRs),
without needing to look into the ‘black box’ of mental events. In Wat-
son's well-known paper ‘Psychology as the behaviorist views it’
(Watson, 1913), he wrote that: “we can write a psychology […] [and]
never use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, in-
trospectively verifiable, imagery, and the like” (p. 166). However, beha-
viorism became criticized from the 1950–1960s onwards for several
reasons, including that it failed to account for subjective experiences
(Graham, 2019). For example, fear conditioning seems to optimally
model posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; i.e., persistent anxiety-re-
lated responses due to the direct experience with a traumatic event,
particularly when presented with associated cues), but core PTSD
symptoms are the distressing and vivid re-experiencing of the traumatic
event. Such intrusive images of aversive experiences in the past or
anticipated in the future are also common in other anxiety-related
disorders (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Engelhard, van
den Hout, Janssen, & van der Beek, 2010; Holmes & Mathews, 2010),
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but they fall outside of the scope of behaviorism as defined by Watson.1
Most likely due to these historical roots, mental imagery, and more
generally emotional episodic memory (Dunsmoor & Kroes, 2019), has
received little attention within fear conditioning research, despite its
clinical relevance. Fear conditioning research could, nevertheless, profit
from more attention for mental imagery and images. To illustrate,
concerns have been raised that fear conditioning is too focused on
simple stimuli (e.g., geometric shapes and electric shock; Mertens,
Wagensveld, & Engelhard, 2019; Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, &
Hermans, 2016), and neglects clinically relevant behaviors (e.g.,
avoidance behaviors; Krypotos, Vervliet, & Engelhard, 2018) and phe-
nomena (e.g., intrusions; Wegerer, Blechert, Kerschbaum, & Wilhelm,
2013). Studying mental images and memories could help fear con-
ditioning research to become more clinically relevant and provide im-
portant insights into the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of an-
xiety-related disorders. For instance, in recent years, research on mental
imagery and how it is involved in psychopathology has been steadily
expanding (for reviews see Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Ji, Heyes,
MacLeod, & Holmes, 2016), and it has shown that therapeutic inter-
ventions that make use of mental imagery are promising for the treat-
ment of anxiety-related disorders (Engelhard, McNally, & van Schie,
2019; Morina, Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). Translation of these insights to
conditioning procedures could help to better understand the underlying
mechanisms of such interventions.
Given these considerations, we think a systematic review of the
available research regarding mental imagery in the context of fear
conditioning is warranted. Therefore, we first introduce contemporary
definitions and measures of mental imagery. Next, we briefly review the
available studies on mental imagery in fear conditioning that have been
previously reviewed in the seminal paper by Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd,
and Cutmore (1997), before moving on to our updated review on this
topic. We conclude this paper with an integration of this research into
contemporary models of fear conditioning and provide an outline of
open questions and avenues for future research.
1.1. Definition, measurement, and control conditions of mental imagery
1.1.1. Definition
Imagery is typically defined as the mental simulation of stimuli or
situation in the absence of physical stimulation and can involve mul-
tiple sensory modalities (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). It is also
often referred to as “seeing with the mind's eye” or “hearing with the
mind's ear” (Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson,
2001). Several theorists have proposed that there is overlap between
processes involved in mental imagery and actual perception (Farah,
1989; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Holmes & Mathews, 2010). In support of
such theories, neuroimaging studies have indicated that engaging in
mental imagery of stimuli activates many of the same brain areas as
those involved in actually perceiving stimuli (Ganis, Thompson, &
Kosslyn, 2004). However, it may be noted that there is ongoing debate
about whether mental imagery reflects ‘mental pictures in the brain’
(pictographic theories) or propositional knowledge about the world
(Kosslyn et al., 2006; Pylyshyn, 2003; Thomas, 2019).
1.1.2. Measurement
Mental imagery is typically measured with self-reports, but these
can be sensitive to spurious factors, such as demand characteristics and
socially desirable responding (e.g., Allbutt, Ling, Heffernan, &
Shafiullah, 2008; Intons-Peterson, 1983). Therefore, other ways to
measure mental imagery have been used, such as behavioral tasks,
psychophysiological measures, and functional neuroimaging. We will
briefly introduce these measures (for a more detailed overview and
review of imagery measures see D. G. Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-
Hadrill, Heyes, & Holmes, 2013).
1.1.2.1. Self-report measures
1.1.2.1.1. Measures of imagery about specific objects or
situations. When participants are instructed to imagine a specific
object or situation, they can be asked to rate its vividness on Likert
scales or Visual Analogue Scales (e.g., “How clear did you find the
image of the memory that you just recalled?“; Mertens et al., 2018b).
Likewise, other dimensions of mental images can be assessed such as
emotionality, distress, valence, fear, and arousal (e.g., Dibbets,
Lemmens, & Voncken, 2018; Kearns & Engelhard, 2015; Mueller,
Sperl, & Panitz, 2019).
Another way to probe mental imagery is to ask participants to
complete a structured diary at home or to press a computer key
whenever an image comes to mind in the laboratory (Berntsen, 2009;
Lau-Zhu, Holmes, & Porcheret, 2018). Such an approach has been used
in the context of involuntary memory of past and future mental events
(e.g., Cole, Staugaard, & Berntsen, 2016; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili,
2008; Wegerer et al., 2013).
1.1.2.1.2. Measures of trait imagery ability. Mental imagery is also
often considered to be a stable inter-individual trait that can be assessed
using questionnaires. Relevant questionnaires include the
Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (QUMI; Sheehan, 1967),
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire-2 (VVIQ-2; Marks, 1995),
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn,
2003), and the Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire (Psi-Q;
Andrade, May, Deeprose, Baugh, & Ganis, 2014). Little information
about the reliability and validity of these questionnaires is available (D.
G. Pearson et al., 2013). In a recent validation study, the Psi-Q
questionnaire showed good internal (.96) and test-retest (.71)
reliability (Andrade et al., 2014) and significant correlations with two
other questionnaires (with VVIQ: r = 0.67; with SUIS: r = 0.40).
However, these questionnaires tend to focus on different aspects of
mental imagery. Some focus on visual mental imagery specifically,
whereas others also focus on imagery in other sensory modalities (see
D. G. Pearson et al., 2013).
1.1.2.2. Behavioral tasks. The study of mental imagery has been
advanced by its linkage to working memory (WM) models (Andrade,
Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997; Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). According to
WMmodels, mental operations are executed by a limited pool of mental
resources. Often, two different subcomponents of WM are distinguished
(next to an overarching central executive): the visuo-spatial sketchpad
and the phonological loop (Baddeley, 2012). Visual mental imagery has
been coupled to the visuo-spatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Andrade,
2000). Due to the limited capacity of the WM systems, their
involvement can be assessed by loading subcomponents of WM by
having participants conduct concurrent WM tasks. Indeed, research has
shown that concurrent visuo-spatial tasks disrupts visual mental
imagery, and vice versa (i.e., engaging in visual mental imagery
interferes with the execution of visuo-spatial tasks) (Baddeley &
Andrade, 2000; Lau-Zhu, Holmes, Butterfield, & Holmes, 2017).2
Hence, decreased performance on visuo-spatial WM tasks may be
1Watson's behaviorism is sometimes referred to as ‘methodological beha-
viorism’, focusing on observable procedures and behaviors, and it explicitly
rejected the study of unobservable events such as mental imagery (see quotes
above). Radical behaviorism advocated by B. F. Skinner, however, does include
analysis of events that are only observable for the organism itself, including
mental imagery (Anderson, Hawkins, Freeman, & Scotti, 2000). Nonetheless,
mental imagery has only received minimal attention in the behavior-analytic
tradition (Thomas, 2019).
2 However, visual mental imagery also affects concurrent tasks with other
modalities (auditory, tactile), presumably due to general load effects (see van
den Hout & Engelhard, 2012). The extent to which WM resources are modality-
specific or nonspecific is a debated issue (Camos, 2017).
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used to establish the involvement of mental imagery. Conversely, visuo-
spatial WM tasks can also be used as an intervention to interfere with
mental imagery (e.g., Baddeley & Andrade, 2000; Leer, Engelhard,
Altink, & van den Hout, 2013; van den Hout & Engelhard, 2012).
1.1.2.3. Psychophysiological correlates
1.1.2.3.1. Defensive responses elicited by mental imagery. According
to the bio-informational model of mental imagery (Lang, 1979), mental
imagery of emotional stimuli elicits physiological responses that are
comparable to direct experience with the imagined stimuli. In support
of this theory, experiments probing different sorts of mental imagery
have demonstrated that it can elicit physiological responses that
correspond to the instructed content of the imagery (Cuthbert et al.,
2003; Vrana & Lang, 1990). As such, physiological responses related to
fear and negative affect can be used as a manipulation check to ensure
that participants engage in aversive mental imagery (Ji et al., 2016), or
as outcome measure to assess the emotional evocative power of mental
images (e.g., Kearns & Engelhard, 2015). These include increased skin
conductance responses, heart rate acceleration, potentiation of the
startle reflex, and pupil dilatation (Cuthbert et al., 2003; Mueller et al.,
2019; Vrana & Lang, 1990).
1.1.2.3.2. Functional neuroimaging of mental imagery. Involvement
of mental imagery can also be established using functional
neuroimaging, given that mental imagery activates brain regions that
correspond with actual perception of the imagined stimuli (Ganis et al.,
2004). In fact, brain activation in these regions appear to correlate
directly with rated vividness of mental imagery (Cui, Jeter, Yang,
Montague, & Eagleman, 2007). As such, fMRI brain activation in areas
previously related to mental imagery can be used as a measure for the
involvement of mental imagery (e.g., Reddan, Wager, & Schiller, 2018).
1.1.2.4. Conclusion about mental imagery measures. The involvement of
mental imagery can be assessed with a heterogenous set of methods.
Prior research indicates that there is a degree of correspondence
between self-report measures, behavioral measures, and
psychophysiological measures of mental imagery (e.g., Cui et al.,
2007; Miller et al., 1987). These sources of information point to a
construct that is reliable (i.e., stable inter-individual difference and
measurable within laboratory tasks) and valid (i.e., convergence across
measures and linked to symptoms in psychological disorders; for
evidence regarding the latter point see Muse, McManus, Hackmann,
Williams, & Williams, 2010). However, it should be noted that a
number of other studies have raised some concerns about
inconsistencies in the factor structure of mental imagery
questionnaires (e.g., Andrade et al., 2014; Campos & Pérez-Fabello,
2005) and the reliability of the correlations between different measures
of mental imagery (e.g., Laor et al., 1999). Therefore, the
correspondence between different imagery measures and the structure
of the latent construct require further research. We revisit this issue in
the Discussion.
1.1.3. Control conditions for mental imagery
Besides the operationalization and measurement of mental imagery,
experimental studies investigating mental imagery (such as the ones
included in this review) require appropriate control conditions. In the
next paragraphs, we briefly introduce five different control conditions
that are often used to investigate mental imagery within fear con-
ditioning research.
1.1.3.1. No imagery instructions. One possible control condition is to
give participants no specific instructions about mental imagery in the
control condition (e.g., ask participants to imagine one stimulus, but
not another; see Grégoire & Greening, 2019). An advantage of this
approach is that participants are not attended in the control condition
to the fact that mental imagery is investigated, thereby reducing
demand bias (Orne, 1962) and the possibility that participants
nonetheless engage in visual imagery. However, a drawback is that
there is little direction for participants on what they should do. This
may be particularly problematic when participants are exposed to vivid
stimuli material. Under such conditions, it is possible that they will
spontaneously engage in mentally rehearsing this information (i.e.,
have involuntary thoughts) (Ball & Brewin, 2012; James et al., 2016),
potentially reducing differences between this control condition and the
experimental condition.
1.1.3.2. Recall only or imaginal exposure. Another control condition is to
ask participants to recall their memory of a certain stimulus or
situation. This condition is typically used to control for the effects of
imaginal exposure in studies in which emotional memories need to be
reprocessed in a certain way such as, for instance, when using lab
models of imagery rescripting or Eye Movement Desensitization and
Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy (see below). Prolonged imaginal
exposure is an effective imagery-based procedure for reduction of fear
(e.g., Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), and merely thinking about an emotional
memory in the lab can reduce the emotional distress prompted by
subsequent recollection (e.g., van Veen, van Schie, van de Schoot, van
den Hout, & Engelhard, 2019). Alternatively, thinking about an
aversive memory may also lead to fear inflation (see below). As such,
‘recall only’ is not a passive control condition. Furthermore, it is
worthwhile to note that ‘recall only’ is a term used in the literature
for this type of manipulation, but does not necessarily imply the recall
of a long-term memory. Therefore, it could also be referred to as
imaginal exposure or mental rehearsal. However, to maintain
consistency with the reviewed papers, we will refer to this control
condition as ‘recall only’.
1.1.3.3. Verbal processing. A third control condition for visual mental
imagery is to ask participants to engage in verbally based processing.
This approach has been used in studies by Holmes and colleagues (for a
review see Holmes & Mathews, 2010), which showed that visual mental
imagery elicits stronger emotional responses compared to verbal
processing. However, it remains unclear whether this is also the case
for mental imagery in other sensory modalities (i.e., auditory, tactile,
olfactory, etc.). Moreover, there is evidence that verbal information
(without instructions to engage in mental imagery) can also strongly
elicit emotional reactions (Costa, Bradley, & Lang, 2015; Mertens,
Boddez, Sevenster, Engelhard, & De Houwer, 2018) and that (visual)
mental images are related to, rather than independent of, (verbal)
expectations and likelihood estimations (Carroll, 1978; Muse et al.,
2010).
1.1.3.4. Irrelevant visual imagery. Another approach is to ask
participants to engage in irrelevant mental imagery, such as imaging
a cat meowing (Jones & Davey, 1990) or a car ride (Arabian, 1982). An
advantage of this approach is that it controls for the general effects of
engaging mental imagery and reduces the chances of spontaneous
imagery of the relevant materials. A drawback is that it is an ‘active’
control condition that may produce certain effects (e.g., engaging in
irrelevant positive imagery may reduce fear; Zbozinek, Holmes, &
Craske, 2015), which can complicate the interpretation of effects
relative to the experimental (relevant imagery) condition.
1.1.3.5. Actual stimulus administration. Finally, participants can be
exposed to the actual stimulus they are asked to imagine in the
experimental condition (e.g., Grégoire & Greening, 2019). A potential
drawback is that the effects of mental imagery may generally be weaker
than those of actual stimulus administration (Dadds et al., 1997).
Hence, weaker effects in the mental imagery condition compared to the
actual stimulus administration condition are expected. However, this
does not necessarily imply that mental imagery had no effects.
Therefore, it may be recommended to supplement this control
condition with one of the other control conditions mentioned
G. Mertens, et al. Behaviour Research and Therapy 126 (2020) 103556
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previously to establish whether mental imagery had any effects at all.
1.1.3.6. Conclusion regarding the control conditions for mental
imagery. The choice of an appropriate control for mental imagery
depends both on theoretical considerations (e.g., whether or not
visual mental imagery is independent of verbal processing) and the
potential interfering factors that one wants to control for (e.g.,
spontaneous mental imagery; experimental demand effects;
habituation). A useful approach is to use multiple control conditions
(e.g., no imagery and actual stimulus administration) to establish the
robustness and generalizability of the effects of mental imagery across
different conditions.
1.2. Previous work reviewed by Dadds et al. (1997) and introduction of the
current review
Early research on the role of imagery in classical conditioning has
been reviewed and integrated by Dadds et al. (1997). Of the reviewed
studies, only four have focused specifically on fear conditioning (the
others focused on conditioned nausea in chemotherapy, vestibular
conditioning, and the habituation of orienting reflexes to novel stimuli).
We have summarized the main findings of these four studies in Table 1.
Based on the reviewed studies, Dadds et al. (1997) concluded that: “The
evidence suggests that mental imagery can facilitate or diminish the outcome
of classical conditioning in humans and, more tentatively, that mental
images can substitute for actual US and CS in autonomic conditioning” (p.
89). However, of the available studies for fear conditioning, one did not
include an appropriate control condition to assess the effect of visual
mental imagery (Drummond, White, & Ashton, 1978), and another one
did not include any measure of mental imagery (Yaremko & Werner,
1974) (see Table 1). As such, with addition of the study by Holzman
and Levis (1991), the results of these initial studies can be considered to
provide preliminary, but not conclusive, support for the idea that
mental imagery can serve as a replacement for the actual administra-
tion of the CS and US. Additionally, the study of Jones and Davey
(1990) provides initial support for the idea that mental imagery during
an extinction procedure can maintain conditioned responses (as mea-
sured with skin conductance responses). Since the initial review of
Dadds et al. (1997), more mental imagery studies have been published
in which a fear conditioning procedure was used.
In the following sections, we provide an overview and updated re-
view of the studies in which mental imagery was investigated within
fear conditioning research since the review by Dadds et al. (1997). It is
important to clarify that, within the context of clinical psychology and
psychopathology, the focus of mental imagery is typically on visual
mental imagery. This is most likely because the visual sensory modality
is generally regarded as the most important sensory modality for hu-
mans (e.g., Ripley & Politzer, 2010). As such, nearly all of the studies
we will review have focused on visual mental imagery (though some
have also focused on tactile mental imagery; i.e., imagining an electric
shock). However, imagery in other modalities (e.g., auditory, tactile,
olfactory) can also be implicated in PTSD and other anxiety-related
disorders (Engelhard, van den Hout, Arntz, & McNally, 2002;
Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004).
2. Methods
To identify relevant studies, we conducted a systematic biblio-
graphical search. Due to the heterogeneity in the methods, measures,
and research questions (see below), we decided to refrain from quan-
titative analyses (e.g., a meta-analysis) and to provide a systematic
review instead. PRISMA-guidelines were followed for the screening,
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2.1. Search strategy
Three digital databases (PsycINFO, Pubmed, Embase) were used to
search for relevant articles published between January 1st, 1995 and
June 14th, 2019. The keywords selected for the search were split into
two categories: Imagery and Conditioning. These subcategory keywords
were connected with the boolean operator “OR”, and the two sub-
category search terms were merged with the boolean operator “AND”.
Keywords used for the search engines Embase, Pubmed, and PsycINFO
were: image*, mental image*, mental representation*, cognitive re-
presentation*, imagery rescripting, intrusive image*, future thinking,
counterfactual thinking, image processing, conditioning, classical con-
ditioning, Pavlovian conditioning, respondent conditioning, associative
learning, and association learning (truncation applied to include var-
iations on image and representation such as imagery, images, and re-
presentations).3 Additional relevant studies were identified through the
reference list of relevant publications and by a prior search conducted
by students on 13th April 2018 (using the same search terms, but in-
cluding Thesaurus Map Terms in the PsycINFO database [imagery and
conditioning] and Medical Subject Headings for PubMed [imagery,
conditioning, classical conditioning, and association learning]). One
additional relevant study was identified by a reviewer during the re-
view process of this article. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the search
strategy.
2.2. Screening process and study exclusion criteria
The identified studies were screened by the first author and a re-
search assistant on the basis of their title and abstract to determine their
potential relevance for our systematic review. Screening was done in-
dependently (using an online tool: https://rayyan.qcri.org/) and con-
flicts in identification were resolved through discussion. The full texts
of 33 identified publications were further screened for final inclusion.
Inclusions criteria were: (1) the use of a fear conditioning procedure;
and (2) the use of an imagery manipulation or measure. An additional
13 publications were further excluded based on these criteria, resulting
in a final selection of 20 publications (reporting 25 separate studies).
2.3. Data extraction and bias assessment
Data extraction focused on the posed research question, population,
instructions for introducing mental imagery, control condition(s),
mental imagery measures, type of CS and US, outcome measures, and
sample size (based on the Population, Intervention, Comparator, and
Outcome, or PICO framework; Huang, Lin, & Demner-Fushman, 2006).
Data extraction was conducted by the first author (GM) and in-
dependently checked by the second author (AMK). Bias assessment
focused on whether the studies included adequate control conditions
and manipulation checks for the involvement of mental imagery (see
Table 2 and the table in the Supplementary Materials).
3. Results
As discussed previously, the studies reviewed by Dadds et al. (1997)
mostly focused on whether imagined stimuli can act as replacements for
the actual administration of CSs and USs (with the exception of the
study by Jones & Davey, 1990). In addition to this first research
question, we identified three other thematic research questions in the
selected studies: (1) Whether mental imagery can lead to fear inflation
(derived from the fear incubation theory; see Eysenck, 1968); (2)
Whether CSs can evoke visual mental images as conditioned responses;
and (3) Whether conditioned fear responses can be reduced though
mental imagery-based interventions. We will discuss the studies in re-
lation to these four research questions. To illustrate the clustering of
these research questions, we created a graphical network (using the
“visNetwork” R package; Almende, Benoit, & Robert, 2019) of the
cross-referencing of the included articles and 4 central theoretical pa-
pers relating to each of the research questions (see Fig. 2). This graph
shows distinct clusters relating to the different research questions, with
a central position for research on mental-imagery based interventions
to reduce conditioned fear. Please note that this figure is not meant as a
network analysis of this research area, but merely as a graphical illus-
tration of the clusters of research on these four distinct research ques-
tions. Furthermore, Table 2 provides an overview of the included stu-
dies and their key procedural characteristics. A more detailed table can
be found in the Supplementary Materials.
3.1. Mental images as replacement for actual stimuli
Similar to the main theme of the Dadds et al. (1997) review, many
of the studies we identified examined whether mental imagery can
substitute the actual administration of the CS, US, or CS-US con-
tingency.4 Regarding whether mental imagery of the CS can substitute
the actual administration of the CS, four studies were identified. Par-
ticularly, Reddan et al. (2018) asked participants to imagine the CS+
and CS- to the best of their ability when they were cued following a fear
conditioning phase with tones. No US was administered during this
imagery phase. In two control conditions, participants were shown ei-
ther actual unreinforced presentations of the CS+ and CS- or were
asked to engage in irrelevant mental imagery when cued (i.e., imagine
birds singing and rain falling). The authors observed comparable fear
extinction (measured by skin conductance) in the imagery condition
and the actual administration condition, but not in the irrelevant
imagery condition. Furthermore, extinction in the relevant imagery and
actual presentations conditions was predicted by activation in similar
brain regions centered on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amyg-
dala, and auditory cortex. However, nucleus accumbens activation ex-
clusively predicted extinction success in the relevant imagery group.
Similarly, Agren, Björkstrand, and Fredrikson (2017) and Grégoire and
Greening (2019) found that mental imagery can induce extinction and
interfere with memory reconsolidation, comparable to actual stimulus
administration. Finally, in a study by Meulders, Harvie, Lorimer
Moseley, and Vlaeyen (2015), participants saw pictures of hand
movements (i.e., open hand or fist). They were asked to make left-right
judgements of the hands, which requires motor imagery. Following the
left-right judgement, one of the hand movements was paired with a
mild electric shock. Meulders et al. (2015) observed conditioned fear
and fear generalization to similar hand movements as indicated by
subjective ratings, suggesting that mental motor imagery resulted in the
acquisition of movement-related fear. However, due to the omission of
an appropriate control condition in this study (e.g., no left-right jud-
gement task), no firm conclusions about mental imagery can be drawn.
An alternative explanation could be that the pictures rather than ima-
gery of the hand movements became conditioned. These four studies
3 PubMed search script: (((((((((((((“Image*") OR “Mental image*") OR
“Mental representation*") OR “Cognitive representation*") OR “Intrusive
image*") OR “Future thinking”) OR “Counterfactual thinking”) OR “Image
processing")) AND ((((((“Association learning”) OR “Associative learning”) OR
“Respondent conditioning”) OR “Pavlovian conditioning”) OR “Classical con-
ditioning”) OR “Conditioning"))) Sort by: Best Match Filters: Publication date
from 1995/01/01; Humans.
4 Note though that some of these studies we describe in this section were
motivated by the fear incubation theory rather than focused on investigating
whether mental imagery can substitute for physical stimulus presentation (see
Fig. 2). Nonetheless, we think that those studies are also relevant for the latter
research question and therefore we already introduce these studies already
here. A more detailed description of the fear incubation theory and the relevant
research is provided in section 3.2.
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thus provide some evidence that, following an acquisition phase with
actual pairings of the CS and the US, mental imagery can substitute for
actual CS administration in subsequent experimental phases (for related
evidence in the context of evaluative conditioning, see Lewis, O'Reilly,
Khuu, & Pearson, 2013).
Other studies have focused on imagination of the US. For instance,
in the study of Mueller et al. (2019) participants were trained to ima-
gine stepping on a thumbtack whenever they saw a particular geometric
shape. This shape was subsequently paired with a neutral face as the CS.
Their results indicated that the imagery cue elicited physiological de-
fensive responding (i.e., skin conductance responses, increased heart
rate), which suggests that participants did indeed engage in mental
imagery of the US. Furthermore, conditioning by pairing CSs with the
cues for mental imagery was observed using aversiveness ratings of the
CS and heart rate acceleration, though not with skin conductance re-
sponses. They replicated the findings in a second study using different
imagery instructions (i.e., imagine a shock). Similar findings that US
imagery can replace actual US administration were found by Arntz,
Spit, and Merckelbach (1997), Davey and Matchett (1994), and
Krypotos, Mertens, Leer, and Engelhard (2019; Experiment 2).
Finally, two studies focused on the effects of mental imagery of the
CS-US contingency (Joos, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 2012; Krypotos
et al., 2019). In the study by Joos et al. (2012), participants first
completed a conditioning phase with faces (CSs) and a loud noise and
scream (USs), and then they were probed three times a day for a week
to “think back to the picture, the [scream/noise] and the relationship be-
tween them” through text messages. They found that fear ratings were
higher for the contingency that was mentally rehearsed, compared to
the contingency (using the other US) that was not rehearsed, but only
when the rehearsed US was a scream (and not the loud noise). Likewise,
in a study from our lab (Krypotos et al., 2019; Experiment 1), partici-
pants were asked to imagine that a previously shown neutral CS (i.e., a
blue square) was followed by a shock. Compared to a control condition
(between-subjects) in which participants were asked to imagine the CS
and a neutral tone, the experimental condition resulted in higher
avoidance responses (i.e., pressing the spacebar to cancel US adminis-
tration) in a subsequent test phase. The results of these studies suggest
that mental imagery of the CS-US contingency can result in the in-
stallation (Krypotos et al., 2019) and preservation (Joos et al., 2012) of
conditioned avoidance and fear responses.
3.2. Mental imagery and fear inflation
Some of the selected studies have been inspired by the fear in-
cubation theory (Eysenck, 1968, 1979; McAllister & McAllister, 1967).
According to the fear-incubation theory, offline processing of traumatic
experiences may contribute to the development of pathological fear and
anxiety, resulting in strengthened conditioned responses over time.
Such offline processing may consist of repeatedly reactivating the
memory of the US, the CS-US contingency, and/or the CS-CR con-
tingency.
Several studies have examined these predictions using a fear con-
ditioning paradigm. Particularly, the studies by Arntz et al. (1997),
Davey and Matchett (1994), and Joos et al. (2012; described in the
previous section) were inspired by the fear incubation theory. In the
study by Arntz et al. (1997), participants were asked to engage in cue-
induced mental imagery (i.e., “Every time when this mark is on the
screen, you have to think of the stimulations you have just experienced
and of how painful they were”) following a conditioning phase with
mild electric shocks as CS and a more intense electric shock as US. In
Fig. 1. Flowchart for the literature search.
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several conditions, participants either received actual US administra-
tions, had to engage in irrelevant pain imagery, or did not receive any
intervention. In a subsequent extinction phase, the US imagery group
demonstrated heightened SCRs compared to the actual US administra-
tion group and the no intervention group (but not compared to the
irrelevant mental imagery group). Similarly, in the studies by Davey
and Matchett (1994), participants were asked to imagine the US fol-
lowing a conditioning phase with a loud tone (115 dB) as the US and
neutral picture as the CSs (i.e., “whenever you see the word think on the
screen you must try and imagine the loud tone presented in Stage 1 and
your reactions to it as vividly as you can”). In a control condition,
participants were asked to engage in irrelevant mental imagery (i.e.,
“think about a cat meowing and reactions to it”). In a subsequent test
phase, participants who had to mentally rehearse the US showed
stronger SCRs to the CS + compared to participants in the control
condition, but this effect was specific for participants high in trait an-
xiety. This result was confirmed in a second experiment in which the
effect of mental US rehearsal was obtained only for participants who
had underwent a somatic worrying induction. Overall, these results
partially support the fear incubation theory. However, no clear evi-
dence has been obtained so far that the effect is specific to mental
imagery of the US rather than unpleasant imagery generally (see Arntz
et al., 1997) and the effects of the mental imagery intervention seem to
dissipate quickly with subsequent unreinforced CS exposures (see
Davey & Matchett, 1994). These latter findings fit less well with pre-
dictions of fear incubation theory.
3.3. Visual mental images as conditioned responses
According to the ‘warning signal hypothesis’ (Ehlers & Clark, 2000;
Ehlers et al., 2002), intrusive memories are concerned with stimuli
(e.g., sounds, odors) that were present immediately before or during a
traumatic event and signal impeding danger, which results in a sense of
current threat. This hypothesis indicates that intrusive memories are a
reflection of an associative learning experience (i.e., the pairing of
neutral cues and a traumatic experience) and may thus be expected to
also occur as a result of a fear conditioning procedure. So far, three
studies have investigated this hypothesis. In an innovative fear con-
ditioning study, Wegerer et al. (2013) induced involuntary memory of a
US. Participants were exposed to a violent video clip (US) while they
heard an auditory CS (i.e., a clock ticking or a typewriter) in the
background. In a subsequent memory triggering task, participants
heard either the CS+, CS-, or no CS while they listened to neutral
background soundscapes (e.g., shopping mall). Assessments using an
intrusion memory questionnaire indicated that participants reported
more, longer, and more distressing mental images (i.e., intrusions) re-
lated to the US when they were exposed to the soundscape including the
CS + than when they were exposed to the soundscape with either the
CS- or no CS.
Two recent studies (Rattel et al., 2019; Streb, Conway, & Michael,
2017) extended these findings by Wegerer et al. (2013) using a similar
paradigm. Streb et al. (2017) found that a CS (clock ticking or train
passing by) paired with a traumatic film tended to elicit intrusive
memories even up to one week after the acquisition phase. Rattel et al.
(2019), using the same paradigm as Wegerer et al. (2013; partly
overlapping sample), found that women, compared to men, displayed a
higher frequency and more distressing intrusions in response to the
presentation of the CS paired with the film clips, both immediately after
the acquisition phase and during an ambulatory assessment. These sex
differences were mediated by stronger responses to the traumatic films,
stronger evaluative conditioning, delayed extinction, and larger state
anxiety increases in women. These three studies indicate that a fear
conditioning procedure can install distressing and persistent mental
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3.4. Reduction of conditioned responses through mental imagery-based
interventions
Several lab studies have addressed whether mental imagery can
reduce conditioned fear responses. A first approach used a laboratory
model of the imagery rescripting intervention (Arntz, 2012; Morina
et al., 2017). Particularly, in a study by Dibbets, Poort, and Arntz
(2012), participants saw a picture of an injured child as the US and of
vehicles as the CSs, and they were told before conditioning to imagine
that the child got injured in an accident with one of the CSs. During the
rescripting intervention, participants were asked to imagine that the
child got saved and recovered after the accident. Dibbets et al. (2012)
found that this intervention reduced return of fear after successful ex-
tinction, as measured with US expectancy ratings (compared to a no-
intervention group and an irrelevant imagery group). Similarly, in
Dibbets et al. (2018), participants were exposed to a video clip in which
a woman gets visibly burned in the face during a kitchen accident. This
video clip (US) was paired with kitchen utensils as CSs. In the imagery
rescripting intervention, participants were asked to imagine that they
were able to help the woman and that she recovered from her burns
after treatment in the hospital. This intervention was compared with an
extinction intervention (i.e., unreinforced CS trials) and an eye-move-
ment intervention (see below). All three interventions were successful
at reducing US representation ratings (i.e., the amount of details and
vividness, evoked tension and averseness, and experienced negativity).
However, the extinction intervention was the most effective of the
different conditions to reduce conditioned skin conductance responses
and US expectancy ratings. Finally, in a series of three studies by Kunze,
Fig. 2. Network graph of the articles included in this review and four central theoretical papers (i.e., Arntz, 2012; Dadds et al., 1997; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Eysenck,
1968; 1979). Colors refer to the main research question we identified (blue: mental images as replacement for actual stimuli; green: visual mental images as
conditioned responses; red: reduction of conditioned responses through mental imagery-based interventions; yellow: mental imagery and fear inflation). Articles
(nodes) at the beginning of each arrow (edge) included the article at the end of the arrow in its reference list. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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Arntz, and Kindt (2019), participants were asked to rescript the content
of a visual US (clips from the film ‘Salo’, or the 12 Days of Sodom’) used
in a prior conditioning phase in which the face of the main character
served as the CS. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine a
more satisfying storyline for the US (e.g., image that the scene was
merely a fake movie) freely (Experiment 1) or using a standardized
rescripting intervention (Experiments 2–3). The effects of this inter-
vention were compared to a condition in which participants merely had
to imagine the US (Experiments 1 and 3) or against an imagery inflation
intervention (Experiment 2). Some aspects of the results of Kunze et al.
(2019) indeed indicated that the interventions could reduce the in-
tensity of the US memory and subjective distress to the CS. However,
the authors note that further steps need to be taken to make the re-
scripting intervention more powerful and to assess its effects against
suitable control conditions.
Another approach to reduce conditioned responses using an ima-
gery-based intervention makes use of a lab model of the eye movement
component of EMDR therapy (Shapiro & Forrest, 2016). Particularly, in
a series of studies by Leer and colleagues (Leer, Engelhard, Altink, et al.,
2013; Leer, Engelhard, Dibbets, & van den Hout, 2013) and Landkroon,
Mertens, and Engelhard (2019), participants were asked to recall the
memory of a visual US while they made lateral eye-movements after a
conditioning phase with the visual US (i.e., an unpleasant IAPS picture
or an unpleasant film clip). There is a considerable amount of research
suggesting that such an intervention can reduce the vividness and
emotional intensity of emotional memories (Engelhard et al., 2019; Lee
& Cuijpers, 2013), and therefore it was expected that this intervention
would reduce the intensity of the US memory and, consequently, reduce
CRs. No consistent effects were found for psychophysiological measures
of fear, but this intervention did indeed attenuate the US memory
(Landkroon et al., 2019; Leer, Engelhard, Altink, et al., 2013), and re-
duced conditioned subjective ratings (Leer, Engelhard, Altink, et al.,
2013) and the return of fear after a context switch (Leer, Engelhard,
Altink, et al., 2013). However, return of fear one day later was not
significantly reduced in the study of Landkroon et al. (2019). So, there
is evidence that the eye-movements approach may be used to reduce
conditioned fear (assessed with subjective measures) at least tempora-
rily, but more studies with long-term follow-up tests are needed.
A third approach using a mental imagery intervention to reduce
conditioned fear responses was reported by Toumbelekis, Liddell, and
Bryant (2018). Particularly, in their procedure, participants were asked
to think of an attachment figure prior to a fear conditioning phase with
colored squares as CSs and an electric shock as the US. Compared to a
control condition in which participants had to think about a hypothe-
tical situation that would make them feel happy (only involving
themselves), thinking of an attachment figure resulted in reduced dif-
ferential fear potentiated startle responses (but not US expectancy rat-
ings), and this difference between the conditions was maintained in a
48h follow-up test. Hence, this study provides preliminary support for
the idea that thinking of an attachment figure can reduce the acquisi-
tion of conditioned startle responses.
Finally, in a study by Zbozinek et al. (2015) a mental imagery mood
induction was used with the aim of reducing return of fear. This hy-
pothesis was based on the idea that lingering negative valence after an
extinction intervention facilitates the return of fear (Dirikx, Hermans,
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2004). In the intervention, partici-
pants were asked to imagine positive scenarios (e.g., “It's your birthday,
and your partner reaches over to you with a present. You open it and feel
incredibly happy”). Compared to a positive verbal training condition,
positive imagery training resulted in more positive affect, reduced ne-
gative CS + evaluation, and reduced the return of fear as measured by
startle responses and fear ratings. This study indicates that a mental
imagery mood induction may be used to reduce conditioned fear re-
sponses and counter the return of fear.
4. Discussion
The current systematic review provided an update of studies on
mental imagery in human fear conditioning since the publication of the
review by Dadds et al. (1997). Based on a systematic search, 20 articles
(reporting 25 studies) were identified that focused on the role of mental
imagery within fear conditioning. These studies were centered around
four thematic research questions: (1) Whether mental imagery can re-
place the actual administration of CSs and USs; (2) Whether mental
imagery can lead to conditioned fear inflation; (3) Whether CSs can
evoke visual mental images; and (4) Whether conditioned fear re-
sponses can be reduced through mental imagery-based interventions.
For each of these questions, some confirmatory evidence has been
found. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the procedures,
measures of mental imagery, and control conditions (see Table 2 and
the Supplementary Materials), complicating any direct comparison
between the studies. Furthermore, the available evidence for each of
the 4 different research questions is currently based on a limited
number of available studies and for some of them relevant control
conditions and manipulation checks are missing (see Table 2). In the
next few paragraphs, we will discuss several theoretical models,
methodological considerations, and open questions that could guide the
further development of research in this field.
4.1. Integration with theoretical models
The results of the reviewed studies validate the view that looking at
the mental level of analysis can yield additional insights compared to
restricting oneself to the observable elements of the procedure. That is,
mental images can be part of the conditioned response, and can be a
replacement for the actual administration of the CS, US, and CS-US
contingencies. Furthermore, considering the potential implication of
mental images in the incubation and preservation of fear, and its pro-
mising role in therapeutic interventions, we argue that mental imagery
should be considered as an indispensable level of analysis in fear con-
ditioning research. This, however, does not imply that the goals of the
behaviorists to focus on observable, and therefore verifiable, behaviors
need to be given up. That is, the functional approach of behaviorists to
link elements in the environment to behavior and the cognitive ap-
proach of studying mental processes that mediate such behavioral ef-
fects are complementary and mutually informative (De Houwer, 2011).
Therefore, they can be studied simultaneously as long as researchers
distinguish between the procedure and effects on the one hand (what
needs to be explained) and the hypothesized cognitive processes (which
provide the explanation) on the other hand (De Houwer, 2011;
Hermans et al., 2018).
Speculating on the function of mental imagery in fear conditioning,
mental images can be seen, just as other commonly observed condi-
tioned fear responses, as preparatory reactions to an upcoming aversive
stimulus. That is, mentally imagining an upcoming US or an intrusive
memory of an earlier aversive event may indicate impending danger
and help in taking appropriate action in dealing with the US. Thus,
mental imaging may serve an important anticipatory function (as a
‘warning signal’; Ehlers et al., 2002), just like other conditioned re-
sponses (e.g., sexual arousal; salivation) have been argued to prepare
for upcoming USs (e.g., sexual intercourse; food intake) (see Domjan,
2005). In fact, other commonly observed conditioned responses in the
context of fear conditioning (e.g., skin conductance responses, po-
tentiated startle responses, accelerated heart rate) may be seen as the
consequence of this anticipation of the US (Davey, 1992; Fanselow &
Pennington, 2017; Lovibond, 2011). Such models with a central med-
iating role of the mental US representation are central to contemporary
models of classical conditioning (Hosoba, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 2001;
Rescorla, 1988).
However, the function of mental imagery in fear conditioning may
extend beyond mere anticipation of and preparation for the US.
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Specifically, mental imagery is proposed to be a constructive process for
developing mental representations of possible future scenarios based on
previous (conditioning) experiences (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007;
Schacter et al., 2012). This feature of mental imagery has clear evolu-
tionary advantages because it allows us to prepare for possible future
situations beyond those previously encountered. This idea is supported
by some of the studies included in this review. Particularly, several
studies demonstrated that mental imagery can install fear responses
even when no physical stimuli have been directly paired (Krypotos
et al., 2019; Lewis et al., 2013; Mueller et al., 2019). Furthermore,
several studies showed that mental revaluation of the US can result in
the spontaneous inflation of conditioned responses (Davey & Matchett,
1994; Gazendam & Kindt, 2012; Joos et al., 2012). Hence, in the ab-
sence of any direct experience, mental imagery can both instill and
strengthen CRs.
Taken together, mental imagery within fear conditioning seems to
be related to the anticipation of and preparation for the occurrence of
the US, and allows us to extend conditioned responses to stimuli, si-
tuations, and contexts that have not been previously experienced. This
fits well with theories of classical conditioning according to which
conditioned responses are the result of the generation of expectations
about an upcoming US (Davey, 1992; Lovibond, 2011; Mertens,
Boddez, et al., 2018; Reiss, 1980). A similar conclusion was recently
reached by Ji et al. (2016) in their review on mental imagery: “These
contemporary accounts view mental imagery as a core component of the
“prospective brain,” which enables the simulation of hypothetical future
events based on prior knowledge and memories of past experience for the
purposes of prediction and planning” (p. 703). This conclusion also fits
nicely with Bayesian models of learning and predictive coding theory,
according to which individuals form predictions about the outside
world, based on their prior experiences (Bubic, von Cramon, &
Schubots, 2010; Kruschke, 2008) and which have recently been used to
develop computational models to understand the symptoms of mental
disorders (Adams, Huys, & Roiser, 2015).
4.2. Limitations, open questions and future directions
A first main limitation of our systematic review is that only 25
studies fitted our inclusion criteria, addressing the four different re-
search questions. Due to this limited number and the lack of metho-
dological standardization, we restricted ourselves to a qualitative as-
sessment of the available studies, rather than using a quantitative
approach (e.g., using meta-analytical tools). A second limitation is that
we largely limited ourselves to giving a descriptive overview of these
studies. A thorough quality assessment was not possible as there are
currently no generally accepted methodological standards on how to
optimally manipulate and control for mental imagery in conditioning
studies (though a lack of any control condition or mental imagery
measure was noted for the reviewed studies and is indicated in Table 2).
A third limitation is that the protocol of our review was not registered
on a public repository (e.g., Prospero). Therefore, it is possible that our
conclusions are unintentionally biased. However, this risk was partly
mitigated by having the literature selection and data extraction in-
dependently checked.
Despite the low number of selected studies, our review shows that
for each of the four questions, tentative confirmatory evidence has been
found. The studies strongly suggest that integrating the research areas
of mental imagery and fear conditioning can advance our under-
standing of the etiology and treatment of anxiety-related disorders.
Therefore, it seems critical that more research will be conducted that
brings these fields together. Given the methodological heterogeneity of
the reviewed studies, more research will have to clarify what optimal
control conditions for mental imagery are and what measures of ima-
gery are optimal as a manipulation check. It also remains unclear
whether mental imagery constitutes a unitary construct, and it is dif-
ficult to compare studies utilizing different control conditions and
mental imagery measures. Large scale initiatives are needed to provide
insights in the differences between the various control conditions for
imagery and how inter-individual differences in mental imagery are
related to subjective, behavioral, psychophysiological, and neural as-
pects of fear conditioning.
Another direction for future research is to pinpoint the learning
principles underlying the reported effects. To illustrate, some of the
imagery effects could be explained by fear generalization (i.e., the
spread-out of CRs from a CS + to similar stimuli; Dymond, Dunsmoor,
Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 2015), second-order conditioning (i.e., the
conditioning of a CS through its pairing with another CS that has been
previously paired with the US; Davey & Arulampalam, 1982) or effects
of verbal instructions (i.e., installation of CRs via mere verbal in-
formation about CS-US contingencies; Mertens, Boddez, et al., 2018).
For example, in the study by Joos et al. (2012) in which participants
were probed to think back about the relationship between the CS and
the US, mentally rehearsing the CS may have allowed for an easier
generalization (possibly due to a better maintained representation of
the CS) of learned fear from the first day to the testing session a week
later. Likewise, in the studies by Mueller et al. (2019), where partici-
pants had to imagine an aversive image (e.g., stepping on a thumbtack)
after being presented a shape and then that shape was paired with a
neutral face, the observed fear responses for the face could be explained
by second order conditioning of the face with the, now aversive, shape.
These potential alternative explanations of the reported effects show
that plenty of work needs to be done before we reach a theoretical
consensus on mental imagery in fear conditioning. Further investigation
is also needed for the prediction that specifically sensory-perceptual
mental imagery elicits strong emotional reactions compared to verbal
processing, a prediction that has been made by several researchers
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Lang, 1979; J.; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes,
& Kosslyn, 2015). Within the fear conditioning literature on mental
imagery, this hypothesis has not received much attention. Only one
study has investigated this hypothesis using an appropriate control
condition (i.e., verbal imagery) (Zbozinek et al., 2015) and another
study demonstrated that verbal-based worrying (rather than mental
imagery) can lead to the strengthening of conditioned fear responses
(Gazendam & Kindt, 2012).
Another important direction for future studies is testing whether
mental imagery ability is a stable inter-individual trait (Andrade et al.,
2014; D. G.; Pearson et al., 2013) that predicts the development and
maintenance of conditioned fear or intrusions in the lab. According to
contemporary fear conditioning models, the intensity of learned fear is
not just determined by threat expectancy but also by threat intensity.
That is, a CS that signals low probability and intense threat can still
elicit strong fear (e.g., the fear that a plane will crash) (Vervliet et al.,
2013). Perhaps individuals with high mental imagery ability develop
US representations that elicit more fear or could more easily imagine a
(low probability) CS-US contingency. Likewise, mental imagery ability
could predict the effectiveness of mental imagery interventions to re-
duce acquired fear. Of the reviewed studies here, only four included
measures of trait imagery (see Table 2). Of these, only Dibbets et al.
(2012) included trait imagery as a factor in the statistical models. They
found no differences regarding effects of the imagery rescripting in-
tervention among participants scoring ‘good’, ‘moderate’, or ‘poor’ on
their trait mental imagery ability. Given that these are the results of a
single study, the hypothesis that trait mental imagery ability matters for
imagery-based interventions requires additional empirical evaluation.
Last but not least, a substantial minority of patients with anxiety-
related disorders benefit insufficiently from exposure-based therapy
and it remains unclear whether mental imagery-based interventions can
enhance treatment effects. For instance, recent studies have found that
patients who show reduced fear extinction in a fear conditioning task
before treatment benefit less from exposure-based therapy (e.g., Geller
et al., 2019). An important area for future lab research would be to test
whether mental imagery based interventions promote approach
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behavior that is needed for exposure therapy and whether individuals
who show reduced extinction learning benefit from interventions that
target the emotionality of threat memories by pharmacological
methods (Elsey, Van Ast, & Kindt, 2018) or by using mental imagery
interventions, such as imagery rescripting or EMDR. Such studies may
provide insights that help in the development of more individualized
and more successful therapy strategies for individuals with anxiety-re-
lated disorders.
5. Conclusions
In this systematic review, we evaluated research addressing the role
of mental imagery and mental images in human fear conditioning.
Overall, the results of these studies fit with earlier conditioning re-
search pointing towards the importance of the anticipation of future
threat events and the mental representations thereof. In contrast to the
strict behaviorist approach advocated by John Watson, and of which
the Little Albert study was a case example, we conclude that it is im-
portant to consider the role of unobservable phenomena, such as mental
imagery, to come to a full understanding of the processes involved in
the fear conditioning procedure and to further expand the potency of
this paradigm to understand the development, maintenance, and
treatment of fear.
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